Federal Circuit and Claim Construction: Resolving the Conflict between the Claims and the Written Description by Gallagher, Gregory J.
NORTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF
LAW & TECHNOLOGY
Volume 4
Issue 1 Fall 2002 Article 7
10-1-2002
Federal Circuit and Claim Construction: Resolving
the Conflict between the Claims and the Written
Description
Gregory J. Gallagher
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/ncjolt
Part of the Law Commons
This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina
Journal of Law & Technology by an authorized administrator of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Gregory J. Gallagher, Federal Circuit and Claim Construction: Resolving the Conflict between the Claims and the Written Description, 4 N.C.
J.L. & Tech. 121 (2002).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/ncjolt/vol4/iss1/7
NORTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY
VOLUME 4, ISSUE 1: FALL 2002
Recent Development: The Federal Circuit and Claim
Construction: Resolving the Conflict between the Claims




Conflicting standards of claim construction confuse patent
practitioners and the patent holders they represent about the scope
of the patent's protection. In particular, claim construction canons
establishing the relationship between the claims and the written
description in determining the scope of protection are unclear.2 In
a recent case, Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa North America Corp. ,3 the
Federal Circuit articulated a comprehensive standard that resolves
this conflict and provides the appropriate amount of protection to a
patentee while providing adequate incentive for innovation. This
Recent Development first explores how the standard developed by
the court in Teleflex provides a logical framework for claim
construction. Second, it describes why the Teleflex approach
provides certainty to claim construction and why it will lead to
even greater certainty in claim construction over time. Finally, this
Recent Development addresses potential criticisms of the Teleflex
standard.
II. Claim Construction and its Conflicting Canons
The role of claim construction in a suit for patent
infringement is of paramount importance. A determination of
patent infringement is a distinct two-step process. First, the court
' J.D. Candidate, University of North Carolina School of Law, 2004.
2 The prosecution history has a similar role to the written description's role in
claim construction. This Recent Development will not discuss the role of the
prosecution history in determining a claim's meaning.
3 Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa N. Am. Corp., 299 F.3d 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2002), reh 'g
and reh 'g en banc denied 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19256 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 30,
2002).
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construes the scope of the claims; then, the court compares the
properly construed claims to the allegedly infringing device to
determine infringement. 4 Often, after claim construction, a party
will be subject to summary judgment because the comparison of an
actual device to the construed claim is relatively straightforward.5
As a result, the claim construction process in a suit for patent
infringement usually determines the outcome of the suit.
6
Unfortunately, the claim construction process has been far
from clear, and, as a result, the amount of litigation regarding
claim construction is voluminous 7 At the center of the difficulty
in construing claims is the Federal Circuit's use of two apparently
conflicting canons of construction with regard to the relationship
between the claims and the written description in determining a
8patent's scope. One canon of claim construction declares that
4 1d. at 1323.
' See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 989 (Fed. Cir.
1995), aff'd, 517 U.S. 370 (1996) (Judge Mayer in his concurrence in Markman
pointed out that "to decide what the claims mean is nearly always to decide the
case."); Christian A. Chu, Empirical Analysis of the Federal Circuit's Claim
Construction Trends, 16 BERKLEY TECH. L.J. 1075, 1107 (2001) (quoting Paul
R. Michel, The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit Must Evolve to Meet
the Challenges Ahead, 48 AM U. L. REv. 1177, 1188-89 (1999)) (predicting that
an increasing ratio of patent infringement suits will be resolved on summary
judgment). See also Toro Co. v. White Consol. Indus., 199 F.3d 1295, 1298
(Fed. Cir. 1999) (noting that the district court granted summary judgment on
literal infringement after claim construction); Wang Labs., Inc. v. Am. Online,
Inc., 197 F.3d 1377, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (observing that "the district court
granted summary judgment of non-infringement as to literal infringement
including infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 112 P6, and also under the doctrine of
equivalents after claim construction").
6 See Chu, supra note 5, at 1107 (quoting Markman v. Westview Instruments,
Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 989 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), aft'd, 517 U.S. 370 (1996)
(Mayer, J. concurring "to decide what the claims mean is nearly always to
decide the use")).
7 See Gretchen Ann Bender, Uncertainty and Unpredictability in Patent
Litigation: The Time is Ripe for a Consistent Claim Construction Methodology,
8 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 175, 203 (2001) ("Since the Supreme Court's Markman
decision on April 23, 1996, the Federal Circuit has reviewed approximately 160
district court claim construction decisions.").
8 See Renishaw P.L.C. v. Marposs Societa' Per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1248
(Fed. Cir. 1998) (observing that plaintiff-appellant's argument that the district
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"one may not read a limitation into a claim from the written
description." 9 A competing canon insists that "one may look to the
written description to define a term already in a claim limitation,
for a claim must be read in view of the specification of which it is
a part."' 0 The Federal Circuit has struggled to reconcile these
seemingly conflicting canons and articulate how to read a claim in
view of the specification without reading limitations into the claim.
At one end of the spectrum are Federal Circuit decisions
holding that claims are construed according to their ordinary and
accustomed meaning, unless the claim itself invites reference to the
written description expressly, or unless the claim itself is unclear."
At the other end of the spectrum are Federal Circuit decisions
holding that anytime the written description of the invention
disclaims subject matter of the invention the claims should be
limited.12 Recent Federal Circuit decisions resolved these differing
approaches to claim construction by adopting an approach that
advocates always looking to the written description when
determining the meaning of claim terms.13 Furthermore, in
Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa North America Corp., the Federal Circuit
court improperly limited a claim term based on the written description
implicates a "pair of claim construction canons..
9 Id.
10 Id.
1" See Johnson Worldwide Assocs. v. Zebco Corp., 175 F.3d 985, 990 (Fed. Cir.
1999) ("[C]laim terms cannot be narrowed by reference to the written
description or prosecution history unless the language of the claims invites
reference to those sources."); Gart v. Logitech, Inc., 254 F.3d 1334, 1341 (Fed.
Cir. 2001) ("[I]t is certainly correct that the specification and the prosecution
history should be consulted to construe the language of the claims. However,
we perform this consultation to determine if the patentee has chosen to be his or
her own lexicographer or when the language itself lacks sufficient clarity ... 
(citations omitted)).
12 See SciMed Life Sys., Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 242 F.3d
1337, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (finding that the claim must be narrowed because
"[t]his is therefore a clear case of disclaimer of subject matter that, absent the
disclaimer, could have been considered to fall within the scope of the claim
language").
13 See Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa N. Am. Corp., 299 F.3d 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2002),
reh 'g and reh 'g en banc denied 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19256 (Fed. Cir. Aug.
30, 2002); CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 288 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir.
2002); SciMed, 242 F.3d at 1337.
articulated a comprehensive standard that provides the courts with
sufficient guidance to determine when it is appropriate to use the
written description of an invention to limit the meaning of a claim
term.
This Recent Development will evaluate the Federal
Circuit's decision in Teleflex along with other significant recent
decisions to show how the Federal Circuit developed a trend for
claim construction that culminated in a clear articulation of when
expressions in the written description limit the meaning of claim
terms.
IM. Recent Decisions
A. Johnson Worldwide Associates v. Zebco Corp. 
14
The first important case in the recent trend toward a
comprehensive standard for claim interpretation based on the
written description is Johnson. The Federal Circuit began its claim
interpretation analysis in Johnson by asserting that there is a heavy
presumption in favor of the ordinary meaning of claim language,
unless the claim language itself points to the written description.' 
5
Under this framework, the court asserted that there are only two
situations according to precedent "where a sufficient reason exists
to require the entry of a definition of a claim term other than its
ordinary and accustomed meaning. ' 6 They are (1) where thepatentee chose to be his or her own lexicographer 17 and (2) where
14 175 F.3d at 985.
15 Id. at 989.16Id. at 990.
17 Often, the public may not be familiar with the terminology of a technical art
or there may not be an existing term that adequately defines a specific structure.
A patent applicant may choose to be his own lexicographer by providing an
explicit definition in the written description for a claim term. Thus, being a
lexicographer simply means that a patent applicant may choose to create words
and their meanings or assign a precise definition to a term. Furthermore, "[t]he
patentees lexicography must, of course, appear 'with reasonable clarity,
deliberateness, and precision' before it can affect the claim." Renishaw P.L.C.
v. Marposs Societa' Per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1249 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (quoting
In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1480 (Fed Cir. 1994)).
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the terms used by the patentee "so deprive the claim of clarity that
there is no means by which the scope of the claim may be
ascertained from the language used.' 18 Thus, the court espoused a
claim construction framework that purported to put strong
emphasis on the claims' language to determine their meaning and
provided only a very limited role for the written description. Not
surprisingly then, the court interpreted the patentee's claims for hig
"Trolling Motor with Heading Lock" according to their ordinary
meaning, thereby giving the patent a broad scope of protection.
B. SciMed Life Systems, Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular
Systems., Inc.
19
To the contrary, in SciMed, the Federal Circuit began a line
of cases that expanded the use of the written description in
determining the meaning of claim terms. In SciMed, the court held
that "[w]here the specification makes clear that the invention does
not include a particular feature," the court will construe the claims
narrowly not to include that feature, even though the claim's
ordinary meaning is clear and may be construed more broadly.20
Thus, the court embraced a claim construction framework where
"the written description can provide guidance as to the meaning of
the claims, thereby dictating the manner in which the claims are to
be construed, even if the guidance is not provided in explicit
definitional format.",
2 1
After concluding that courts could limit an otherwise clear
claim term, the SciMed court used five recent cases to show how
courts have limited a patentee's claims based on representations
made in the written description.22 According to those cases, a
court will limit a claim's meaning: (1) when the specification
describes only one feature and states that "the present invention"
utilizes that feature; 23 (2) "[w]hen the 'preferred embodiment' is
18 Johnson, 175 F.3d at 990.
19 242 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
20Id. at 1341.
21 Id. at 1344.
22 1d. at 1341-42.
23 Watts v. XL Sys., Inc., 232 F.3d 877, 882-83 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
described as the invention itself ... ,,;24 (3) when patentees
expressly disclaimed subject matter in the written description; 25 (4)
when patentees expressly disclaimed subject matter to avoid the
prior art;26 and (5) when the specification and drawings show a
feature, do not illustrate or describe any other structure, and
describe the advantages of the feature as important to the
invention.27
The SciMed court then held that the claim language at issue
must be narrowed in accordance with the prior cases because the
specification expressly disclaimed subject matter to avoid prior art
and pointed to the advantages of doing so. 28 In a concurring
opinion, Judge Dyk agreed that the court should look to the written
description for guidance as to the meaning of the claim.29
However, Judge Dyk asserted that the SciMed court did not
provide adequate guidance as to when it is appropriate to limit
claim terms based on the specification.3 °
C. CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp. 31
In CCS Fitness, the Federal Circuit added momentum to
SciMed's express holding by articulating a concise rule. The CCS
Fitness court held that a court may limit otherwise clear claim
terms when "the intrinsic evidence shows that the patentee
distinguished that term from prior art on the basis of a particular
embodiment, expressly disclaimed subject matter, or described a
24 Wang Labs, Inc. v. Am. Online, Inc., 197 F.3d 1377, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
25 Cultor Corp. v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 224 F.3d 1328, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
26 0.1. Corp. v. Tekmar Co., 115 F.3d 1576, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
27 Toro Co. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 199 F.3d 1295, 1302 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
28 SciMed Life Sys., Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 242 F.3d 1337,
1342-43 (Fed. Cir. 2001) ("[T]he written description of each of the patents
explains that the prior art catheters with shortened guide wire lumens 'suffer
from several disadvantages.' The first cited disadvantage is that 'such catheters
have been one piece polyethylene catheters having dual lumen configurations
adjacent their distal regions. Typically, such catheters have larger than




31 288 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
N.C. J.L. & TECH. [VOL. 4
FALL 2002] THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND CLAIM CONSTRUCTION 127
particular embodiment as important to the invention."3 2 This rule
encompasses the five situations identified by the SciMed court as
being appropriate to limit a claim term's meaning. Additionally,
this rule appears to address Judge Dyk's criticism in SciMed
because the "three category standard" is generally applicable when
interpreting claims and, thus, provides guidance to courts,
patentees, and the public.
Most recently, in Teleflex the Federal Circuit refined the
rule developed in SciMed and CCS Fitness. In Teleflex, the court
expressly added to the Johnson exceptions to the general rule that a
claim term must take on its ordinary and accustomed meaning.
33
To this end, the court expressly held that "[t]he patentee may
demonstrate an intent to deviate from the ordinary and accustomed
meaning of a claim term by redefining the term or by
characterizing the invention in the intrinsic record using words or
expressions of manifest exclusion or restriction, representing a
clear disavowal of claim scope."34 This most recent articulation of
an exception to the "ordinary and accustomed meaning" rule
encompasses the rule applied in both SciMed and CCS Fitness and
broadens the court's ability to construe claims.
The decision in Teleflex was necessary because the SciMed
and CCS Fitness courts did not provide a comprehensive standard
for determining when the written description limits the ordinary
and plain meaning of terms in the claims. Instead, the courts
simply identified circumstances in which it would be appropriate
to do so.35 The Teleflex court solved the problems left unresolved
in SciMed and CCS Fitness by providing a comprehensive and
flexible standard that provides sufficient guidance for when it is
acceptable to limit claim terms based on representations made in
the written description of the invention.
32 Id. at 1366-67.
33 See Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa N. Am. Corp., 299 F.3d 1313, 1327 (Fed. Cir.
2002) (holding that a claim term may be limited by the specification "via other
routes" than the inventor choosing to be his own lexicographer and where claim
terms lack sufficient clarity to permit the scope to be ascertained), reh 'g and
reh 'g en banc denied 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19256 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 30, 2002).
34 Id. (emphasis added).
35 See supra notes 23-28, 32 and accompanying text.
D. Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa North America Corp. 36
Both Teleflex, Inc. ("Teleflex") and Ficosa North
American Corporation ("Ficosa") manufactured shift cables for use
in automatic transmissions for automobiles.3 7 Teleflex had a
successful relationship with General Motors, Inc. ("General
Motors") and supplied "two-piece shift cables" to General Motors
for use in the automatic transmissions of its sport utility vehicles.38
In 1990, Teleflex and Ficosa entered into a joint venture to market
the cables in Europe where Ficosa had traditionally done
business.39 However, the venture fell apart, and soon after,
Teleflex discovered that Ficosa had attempted to sell shift cables to
General Motors in North America.40 After this discovery, Teleflex
sued Ficosa for patent infringement in federal district court,
alleging that Ficosa had infrined its patent for a component part
of the "two-piece shift cable." 1 As in most patent infringement
suits, the district court's claim construction was a primary issue.
In Teleflex, the district court construed a claim term by
limiting the term to a meaning consistent with the written
description of the preferred embodiment. 42 The Federal Circuit
concluded that the district court erred in narrowing the meaning of
the term "clip" to a clip with a single pair of legs based on the
description of a single embodiment. 43 The defendant, Ficosa,
argued that the district court was correct because "where only one
embodiment is disclosed in the specification, claim terms are
limited to the embodiment disclosed.,
44
Ficosa's argument shows how the role of the written
description in construing claim terms confuses practitioners. Some
practitioners believed that the Federal Circuit had established a so-





42 See id. at 1328 (holding that the "district court thus erred by importing the
'single pair of legs' limitation from the specification into the claim").
43 Id.
44Id. at 1326.
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called "single embodiment rule" in cases such as Toro Co. v. White
Consolidated Industries, Inc. ,45 Wang Laboratories, Inc. v.
America Online, Inc.,46 and Bell Atlantic Network Services, Inc. v.
Covad Communications Group, Inc. 47 that limited the scope of an
invention to the preferred embodiment if only one embodiment
48was disclosed. In Teleflex, the Federal Circuit expressly rejected
this notion of a "single embodiment rule" and held that the number
of embodiments described is not determinative.
49
Instead, the Federal Circuit articulated a comprehensive
standard in Teleflex for determining when a claim term's meaning
should be limited based on the written description. The court held
that:
claim terms take on their ordinary and accustomed
meanings unless the patentee demonstrated an intent
to deviate from the ordinary and accustomed
meaning of a claim term by redefining the term or
by characterizing the invention in the intrinsic
record using words or expressions of manifest
exclusion or restriction, representing a clear
disavowal of claim scope.5°
The Teleflex court applied this "words or expressions of
manifest exclusion or restriction" standard to analyze the district
court's claim construction. In doing so, the court found that the
written description did not include "an expression of manifest
exclusion or restriction demonstrating an intent to limit 'clip'...
,51 The court observed that the word "clip" was not defined in the
written description and that, although there was only a single
45 Toro Co. v. White Consol. Indus., 199 F.3d 1295 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
46 Wang Labs., Inc. v. Am. Online, Inc., 197 F.3d 1377 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
47 Bell At. Network Servs., Inc. v. Covad Communications Group, Inc., 262
F.3d 1258, 1273 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
48 See Teleflex, 299 F.3d at 1326 ("[Defendant] argues that where only one
embodiment is disclosed in the specification, claim terms are limited to the
embodiment disclosed, citing Toro Co. v. White Consol. Indus., Wang Labs.,
Inc. v. Am. Online, Inc., and Bell Atl. Network Servs., Inc. v. Covad
Communications Group, Inc." (citations omitted)).491Id. at 1327.
50 id.
51 Id.
embodiment showing the clip with a single pair of legs, there were
no "clear statements of scope" limiting the term "clip.,5 2 The
court's claim construction comports with the trend of recent
Federal Circuit decisions looking to the written description in
determining the meaning of claim terms and, consequently, patent
scope.
IV. Discussion
A. The Teleflex Framework is the Most Logical
According to Claim Construction Canons
In Teleflex, the Federal Circuit establishes the most logical
method for how the court should use the claims, written
description, and prosecution history to obtain the precise scope of
the patentee's right to exclude. As established by the Supreme
Court in Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., claim
construction must adhere to the principle "that a term can be
defined only in a way that comports with the instrument as a
whole., 53 Moreover, "[t]o ascertain the meaning of claims, [the
court] consider[s] three sources: The claims, the specification, and
the prosecution history., 54 Thus, the written description, which is
a part of the specification, 55 plays a role in interpreting the
meaning of claims.
Furthermore, the federal statute controlling patents
provides that "[t]he specification shall conclude with one or more
claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject
matter which the applicant regards as his invention., 56 It is a well-
settled principle of claim construction that claim construction
52 Id. at 1327-28.
53 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 389 (1996).
54 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 979 (1995) (quoting
Unique Concepts, Inc. v. Brown, 939 F.2d 1558, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1991)), aff'd,
517 U.S. 370 (1996).
5' 37 C.F.R. § 1.71(a) (2002) ("The specification must include a written
description of the invention or discovery ....
56 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000).
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analysis begins and ends with the words of the claim.57 As the
court acknowledged in Teleflex, "[t]he claims define the scope of
the right to exclude; the claim construction inquiry, therefore,
begins and ends in all cases with the actual words of the claim.'"58
Another important canon of claim construction is that a
claim term is given its ordinary and accustomed meaning as
determined from the standpoint of a person of ordinary skill in the
relevant art. 59 This "ordinary meaning" rule, however, has been
qualified by two distinct exceptions. First, a patentee may choose
to be his own lexicographer by defining "specific terms used to
describe the invention 'with reasonable clarity, deliberateness, and
precision.' 60 This rule is necessary because the public may not
understand the terminology of the technical art or there may not be
a single term that embodies the concept of the invention with
sufficient precision. 61 The second exception to the "ordinary
meaning" rule is that the court may use the written description to
interpret a claim term where the term "lacks sufficient clarity to
permit the scope of the claim to be ascertained from the words
alone." 62 Thus, the court must always review the specification,
which includes a background of the invention, summary of
invention, brief description of the drawings, description of
preferred embodiment, and the claims, to determine whether the
patentee used any term in a manner inconsistent with its ordinary
meaning.63
Difficulty in determining the meaning of a claim term
generally arises when the patentee provides a non-technical word
"7 Teleflex, 299 F.3d at 1324; Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d
1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
58 Id. (citing Renishaw P.L.C. v. Marposs Societa' Per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243,
1248 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
" Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582.
60 Teleflex, 299 F.3d at 1325 (quoting In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1480 (Fed.
Cir. 1994)).
61 Renishaw, 158 F.3d at 1249.
62 Teleflex, 299 F.3d at 1325.
63 See Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582 ("[I]t is always necessary to review the
specification to determine whether the inventor has used any terms in a manner
inconsistent with their ordinary meaning. The specification acts as a dictionary
when it expressly defines terms used in the claims or when it defines terms by
implication.").
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in a claim that either has a very broad ordinary and accustomed
meaning or has several ordinary meanings. For example, in
Teleflex, the disputed term was "clip," in Toro, it was "including,"
and in Renishaw P.L. C. v. Marposs Societa ' Per Azioni, the
disputed term was "when." 64 In each of these cases, the litigants
argued over whether the term should be limited by expressions in
the written description or should be allowed to maintain its broad
ordinary meaning.
Where a claim uses a term with a broad meaning or with
several meanings, the court must narrow its meaning if the written
description provides "words or expressions of manifest exclusion
or restriction, representing a clear disavowal of claim scope." 65
There are two bases for this assertion. First, where a term is used
that has a very broad ordinary meaning, the court may deem that
term so "sufficiently broad and amorphous that the scope of the
claim language can be reconciled only with recourse to the written
description." 6 Second, once the court turns to the specification
and finds a characterization of the invention that is clearly and
directly contrary to the ordinary meaning of an otherwise broad
term, the court cannot ignore the limitations imposed on the
claims.
67
Ignoring clear disavowals of claim scope in the written
description and other parts of the specification would violate at
6 See Teleflex, 299 F.3d at 1324 ("In this case, the parties disagree as to whether
the district court correctly performed the first step with regard to the 'clip (28)'
limitation in claim 1 of the '182 patent."); Toro Co. v. White Consol. Indus.,
Inc., 199 F.3d 1295, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 1999) ("It is a matter of interpretation of the
words 'including' and 'cover' to determine whether, as a matter of law, the
claim requires that the cover and the ring are attached to each other.");
Renishaw, 158 F.3d at 1251 ("Because infringement of this limitation depends
on the meaning of the word 'when,' we refer to it in the remainder of the
opinion as the 'when' limitation.").
Teleflex, 299 F.3d at 1327.
66 Bell Atl. Network Servs., Inc. v. Covad Communications Group, Inc., 262
F.3d 1258, 1269-70 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
67 See, e.g., Wang Labs., Inc. v. Am. Online, Inc., 197 F.3d 1377, 1383 (Fed.
Cir. 1999) ("Although Wang is correct that a claim is not invalid simply because
it embraces subject matter that is not specifically illustrated, in order to be
covered by the claims that subject matter must be sufficiently described as the
applicant's invention ... ").
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least two paramount principles of claim construction. First,
ignoring clear disavowals of claim scope and interpreting a claim
term in accordance with its ordinary meaning would violate the
principle that a court must interpret the patent document as a
whole. Second, ignoring clear disavowals of claim scope would
violate the principle that "[c]laims are to be construed in light of
the specifications and both are to be read with a view to
ascertaining the invention.' 69 Thus, as the courts in both Wang
and Bell Atl. indicate, interpreting a claim more broadly than the
invention's scope would not make sense.
In Wang, the Federal Circuit defined the claim term
"frame" in accordance with the use of the term in the written
description. 70 According to the court, the patentee used the term
"frame" consistently throughout the specification with respect to a
character-based Vrotocol, and not with respect to bit-mapped
display systems. Furthermore, the court concluded that the single
embodiment in the specification was the actual invention; thus, the
court could not construe the claim terms more broadly than that
embodiment.72 When the court read the patent "as a whole," as it
must be read, it was clear that the patentee did not possess the bit-
mapped display system as part of the invention. 73 Thus, the court
gave the term "frame" a narrow meaning in accordance with the
invention.
Similarly, in Bell Atlantic, the district court construed the
term "modes" as limited to three categories defined in the
specification.7 q The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court's
68 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. 517 U.S. 370, 389 (1996).
69 United States v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39, 49 (1966).
71 Wang, 197 F.3d at 1383.
71 See id. at 1381-82 (concluding that references to protocols other than
character-based systems did not describe them as part of the invention but as
"acknowledgments of the state of the art").72Id. at 1383.
73 See id. ("Whether an invention is fairly claimed more broadly than the
'preferred embodiment' in the specification is a question specific to the content
of the specification, the context in which the embodiment is described, the
p4rosecution history, and if appropriate the prior art....").
14 Bell Atl. Network Servs., Inc. v. Covad Communications Group, Inc., 262
F.3d 1258, 1266 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
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finding that the three modes discussed in the specification "literally
occupy the field of possibilities contemplated by the ... patent."
75
Additionally, the Federal Circuit asserted that the specification
consistently used "the terms 'mode' and 'rate' to refer to two
different and distinct concepts. 76 Thus, the court narrowed the
term "mode," reasoning that giving the term its broad meaning
would go beyond the actual invention possessed by the inventor.
77
Yet again, when the Federal Circuit was confronted with a claim
term whose ordinary meaning was broader than the invention as
clearly disclosed in the specification, the court was bound to
narrow the meaning of the term.
Furthermore, the framework proposed in Teleflex protects
the ordinary meaning of a claim term by providing a heavy
presumption in favor of that meaning and requiring clear
disavowals of claim scope in the written description of the
invention.78 Claim construction is a complex process, and the
court must always complete the process within the context of the
intrinsic record.79 By providing that otherwise clear claim terms
must be given their ordinary meaning unless there are expressions
of manifest exclusion or restriction, the court provided a measuring
stick by which to review lower court decisions. This framework
provides the appropriate balance between the claims and the
written description because the claim terms define the scope of the
inquiry, and the written description provides the context necessary
to determine the scope of the invention.
75 Id.
76Id. at 1272.
77 See id. at 1273 (concluding that the definition of "mode" as described by the
detailed description of the preferred embodiments as three modes is limited to
such modes on the basis that claims are not entitled to a broader scope than the
invention).
78 Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa N. Am. Corp., 299 F.3d 1313, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2002),
reh 'g and reh 'g en banc denied 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19256 (Fed. Cir. Aug.
30, 2002).79 1d. at 1324-25.
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B. The Claim Construction Framework in Teleflex Will
Provide Certainty over Time
Any framework for claim construction must provide
certainty to avoid wasting judicial resources and to provide for
stable property rights. 8 To achieve certainty in claim
construction, courts must stake out the metes and bounds of the
patent's protection, and courts must construe patents consistently.
The Supreme Court explained the importance of knowing the
metes and bounds of a patent in Markman:
[T]he limits of a patent must be known for the
protection of the patentee, the encouragement of the
inventive genius of others and the assurance that the
subject of the patent will be dedicated ultimately to
the public. Otherwise, a 'zone of uncertainty which
enterprise and experimentation may enter only at
the risk of infringement claims would discourage
invention only a little less than unequivocal
foreclosure of the field,' and the public [would] be
deprived of rights supposed to belong to it, without
being clearly told what it is that limits these rights.8 2
Unfortunately, claim construction is an uncertain process.
To begin with, courts must construe terms within the context of the
claims, the written description, the drawings, and the prosecution
history.84 Interpreting a claim in the context of the entire intrinsic
record is difficult. To complicate claim construction, patents
80 See, e.g., Bender, supra note 7, at 175 ("Corporations, in-house counsel and
even trial litigators require certainty and predictability in order to develop
products, businesses and litigation strategies.").
81 Russell B. Hill & Frank P. Cote, Ending the Federal Circuit Crapshoot:
Emphasizing Plain Meaning in Patent Claim Interpretation, 42 IDEA 1, 1
(2002).
82 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. 517 U.S. 370, 390 (1996) (citing
General Elec. Co. v. Wabash Appliance Corp., 304 U.S. 364 (1938); United
Carbon Co. v. Binney & Smith Co., 317 U.S. 228 (1942); Merrill v. Yeomans,
94 U.S. 568 (1877)).
83 See Bender, supra note 7, at 175 ("The Federal Circuit changes the trial
court's claim construction in approximately forty percent of its cases.").
84 Markman, 517 U.S. at 389.
generally cover exceptionally sophisticated subject matter for
which there is no precise vocabulary available. Although the
subject matter of most patents may be grouped according to
whether they are in the mechanical arts, electrical arts, computer
arts, and so on, the actual range of potential subject matter is
almost limitless. Thus, courts cannot use claim construction
canons as a set of step-by-step rules to extract the scope of every
invention. 85 Instead, claim construction canons are a framework
courts employ to arrive at term interpretations that comport with a
"full understanding of what the inventors actually invented and
intended to envelop with the claim."
86
The key to providing the maximum amount of certainty in
the claim construction process is to develop a logical framework
that comports with the overall goals of patent law and to apply this
framework consistently. The framework asserted in Teleflex
provides a logical framework that achieves the goals of patent
law. 87 In fact, the Teleflex framework is inescapable in its
application because it ascertains the "true invention., 88 The
inescapable nature of the Teleflex framework provides inherent
certainty. Thus, patentees, inventors, patent examiners, patent
agents, patent attorneys, and the courts need only look to the recent
case law in the context of the framework asserted in Teleflex to
understand how the claims and written description relate to one
another. Two cases, Johnson Worldwide Associates, Inc. v. Zebco
Corp.89 and Gart v. Logitech, Inc.,90 illustrate this point.
Both Johnson and Gart purport to use a claim construction
contrary to Teleflex.91 However, under close examination even
85 See Renishaw P.L.C. v. Marposs Societa' Per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1250
(Fed. Cir. 1998) (asserting that "[a] claim construction is persuasive, not because
it follows a certain rule, but because it defines terms in the context of the whole
patent").
86 id.
87 See supra Part IV.A.
88 See, e.g., Renishaw, 158 F.3d at 1250 (observing that a claim term must be
interpreted "with a full understanding of what the inventors actually invented").
89 Johnson Worldwide Assocs. v. Zebco Corp., 175 F.3d 985 (1999).
90 Gart v. Logitech, Inc., 254 F.3d 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
91 See Johnson, 175 F.3d at 990 (holding that only when a patentee chooses to be
his own lexicographer or claim terms are ambiguous does "a term or terms used
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these cases employ the "expressions of manifest exclusion" rule of
Teleflex. In Johnson, for instance, the plaintiff-patentee had a
patent for an apparatus that functioned as a sort of autopilot for
small outboard electric trolling motors. 9 2 The preferred
embodiment as set forth in the written description employed a
compass attached directly to the trolling motor.93 The defendant,
Zebco Corp. ("Zebco"), argued that the plaintiff's patent covered
only those trolling motor autopilot systems where the directional
indicator attached directly to the trolling motor. Specifically,
Zebco argued that the proper interpretation of the terms "heading
signal" and "coupled" required the scope of the claim to be limited
to a directional indicator that is mechanically attached to the
trolling motor.94 Zebco based this argument on the meaning of the
word "heading" used in the written description and drawings of the
preferred embodiment.
95
The court in Johnson did not endorse a claim construction
framework that always looks to the written description for
guidance in determining the meaning of claim terms. Instead, the
court held that the written description should only be used to limit
a claim term where the patentee has chosen to be his own
lexicographer or where the terms used by the patentee lack
sufficient clarity.96 Nevertheless, the court's claim construction is
completely consistent with the framework asserted in Teleflex.
The court held the following: (1) that the term heading had many
varied uses in the written description, (2) that the varied uses of the
term demonstrated a broad scope, and (3) that there was a lack of
unambiguous language limiting the scope in the written
in the claim invites-or indeed, requires-reference to intrinsic, or in some
cases, extrinsic evidence"); Gart, 254 F.3d at 1341 (A court looks to the written
description only when a patentee chooses to be his own lexicographer or when
claim terms lack sufficient clarity. "[W]hen the foregoing circumstances are not
present, we follow the general rule that terms in the claim are to be given their
ordinary and accustomed meaning.").92 Johnson, 175 F.3d at 987.
93 id.
94 Id. at 988-89.
95 id. at 989.96 Id. at 990.
description.97 Thus, the court in Johnson did not look to see if the
patentee chose to be his own lexicographer or if the claim term
lacked sufficient clarity. Instead, the court applied the "using
words or expressions of manifest exclusion or restriction"
standard. Concluding that the plaintiff-patentee did not use the
claim term "heading" in a consistent manner that restricted claim
scope, the court found that the ordinary meaning of the term
"heading" should apply.
98
Likewise, in Gart, the plaintiff-patentee had a patent for an
ergonomically shaped computer mouse for reducing muscle
fatigue.99 The district court construed the claim phrase "an angular
medial surface" to require that the mouse housing have "an angular
ledge." 100 In support of the district court's claim construction, the
defendant, Logitech, Inc. ("Logitech"), asserted that all drawings
of the preferred embodiment possessed an angular ledge. 101
Furthermore, Logitech asserted that "the written description
particularly describes the invention as a 'medial ledge undercut"'
and that this reference is not related to a preferred embodiment
and, thus, must relate to the invention.1
0 2
Once again, the court did not explicitly endorse a claim
construction framework as set forth later in Teleflex. Nevertheless,
the Gart court's claim construction is also consistent with the
Teleflex framework. In holding that the "angular ledge" limitation
not be imported into the claim, the court found that the
specification did not describe "the invention" as having an angular
ledge. 10 3 Furthermore, the court found that "[t]he written
description does not explicitly limit the subject matter of the patent
to the ledge configuration set forth in the drawings."' 1 4 Thus, the
9' Id. at 991.
98 Id. at 992 (concluding that "Zebco thus has not shown that sufficient reasons
exist to import a limited definition of this term into the clear language of the
claim").
99 Gart v. Logitech, Inc., 254 F.3d 1334, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
'
00 Id. at 1340.
101 Id.
102 id.
103 Id. at 1342 (finding that references to the preferred embodiment "did not
contain all of the ergonomic surface feature of the invention...
04id.
N.C. J.L. & TECH. [VOL. 4
FALL 20021 THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND CLAIM CONSTRUCTION 139
Gart court construed a term by looking to the written description,
even though the court did not find that the patentee chose to be his
own lexicographer, and the claim term lacked sufficient clarity.
Once again, a court, purporting to use the Johnson framework,
explicitly looked to the written description for "expressions or
words of manifest exclusion, representing clear disavowals of
scope."105 When the court found no such expressions or words, the
ordinary meaning was allowed. 
106
In addition to the Teleflex framework's inherent ability to
provide certainty because of its inescapable logic, the rule in
Teleflex will increase the amount of certainty over time as
practitioners have time to review the court's consistent use of the
framework. 10 7 Furthermore, the standard makes it clear to those
preparing patent applications and prosecuting patents that the
language used in the written description and the claims must have
the same meaning, a rule that is consistent with the requirements of
35 USC § 112.108
105 See id. at 1341-42 (failing to find that the patentee chose to be his own
lexicographer or that the claims lacked sufficient clarity, nevertheless, using the
written description to determine the scope of claim terms).106 Id. at 1342 ("[T]here were no express representations made in obtaining the
patent regarding the scope and meaning of the claim terms. Moreover, the scope
of claim 7 may be ascertained from the plain language of that claim.").
107 See Bender, supra note 7, at 222 ("At a minimum, the consistent use by all
courts of a specific claim construction approach will correct the current
problems of uncertainty.").
108 The specification shall contain a written description of the
invention, and of the manner and process of making and using
it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any
person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is
most nearly connected, to make and use the same.... The
specification shall conclude with one or more claims
particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject
matter which the applicant regard as his invention.
35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000).
C. Response to Criticisms that the Teleflex Framework
is Less Certain than the Ordinary and Accustomed
Meaning Rule and Requires a Description of All
Potential Embodiments
One criticism of the Teleflex framework is that by allowing
the court to overcome the ordinary meaning of a claim term by
finding "expressions of manifest exclusion or restriction" the court
may give a claim term an implied definition based on the written
description. 109 The consequence of allowing the court to determine
an implied meaning is that the court will read "unintended
limitations into the claims from the written description."
' 10
According to this criticism, the court must be forced into a more
rigid claim construction framework, one that depends on either
express representations by the patentee, or a lack of clarity in claim
terms before looking to the written description."'
However, this argument has three serious problems. First,
it overlooks the plain fact that courts, patentees, and the public
must look to the patent as a whole to ascertain the scope of
protection.11 2 Second, this argument fails to notice the fact that
many claim terms, although clear and unambiguous on their face,
do not provide sufficient specificity to be given a broad meaning,
especially in the presence of a manifest expression of restriction or
exclusion.113 To give a claim term a meaning that clearly is
contrary to what the patentee describes as the invention is
unsupportable. 114 Finally, this criticism is based on the mistaken




112 See Renishaw P.L.C. v. Marposs Societa' Per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1250
(Fed. Cir. 1998) ("The construction that stays true to the claim language and
most naturally aligns with the patent's description of the invention will be, in the
end, the correct construction.").
113 See Toro Co. v. White Consol. Indus., 199 F.3d 1295, 1300 (Fed. Cir. 1999)
(holding the term "cover" must be limited); Renishaw, 158 F.3d at 1250-51
(holding that the term "when" has too many ordinary meanings and is limited to
the meaning given in the written description).
114 See ROBERT L. HARMON, PATENTS AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT § 5.6(b) (5th
ed. 2001) ("Ultimately, the interpretation to be given a term can only be
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belief that interpreting claim terms in the context of the written
description is the same as importing a limitation from the written
description. 115 On the contrary, the written description may be
properly used to narrow a claim term without improperly
importing a limitation into the claim. 
1 6
Another criticism of the framework established in Teleflex
is that the framework requires that the written description describe
the "invention" in all its potential embodiments.1 17 This
interpretation of the claim construction framework asserted in
Teleflex is mistaken. The court in Teleflex was careful in expressly
holding that the number of embodiments described in a
specification is not determinative."l 8 Furthermore, the framework
in Teleflex does not mean that a patentee must fully describe the
"true invention" in the written description, although doing so may
be necessary under the written description requirement. The
framework in Teleflex properly avoids such validity considerations
by holding that if the invention is clearly restricted, or if subject
matter is clearly excluded from a claim term's meaning, then the
court will give a claim term a narrow interpretation. Thus, the
court in Teleflex avoided involving the written description
requirement by limiting its approach to claim construction.
determined and confirmed with a full understanding of what the inventors
actually invented and intended to envelop with the claim.").
115 See Hill & Cote, supra note 81, at 23 ("The pernicious result of applying the
'implied meaning' logic of cases like Bell Atlantic is reading unintended
limitations into the claims from the written description. Thus, this logic runs
afoul of long-standing Federal Circuit claim construction principles.").
116 See HARMON, supra note 114, § 5.6(c)
There is sometimes a fine line between reading a claim in light
of the specification, and reading a limitation into the claim
from the specification .... [W]hile it is entirely proper to use
the specification to interpret what the patentee meant by a
word or phrase in the claim, this is not to be confused with
adding an extraneous limitation appearing in the specification,
which is improper.
Id.
117 Hill & Cote, supra note 81, at 7.
118 Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa N. Am. Corp., 299 F.3d 1313, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
(holding "[i]n sum, the number of embodiments disclosed in the specification is
not determinative of the meaning of disputed claim terms"), reh 'g and reh 'g en
banc denied 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19256 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 30, 2002).
V. Conclusion
The Federal Circuit's use of conflicting claim construction
canons confused patentees and practitioners and made determining
the scope of a patent uncertain. In Teleflex, the Federal Circuit
resolved this confusion by providing a comprehensive standard
that finally establishes a clear relationship between a patent's
claims and the written description.l9 The claims are preeminent
120
and define the limits of the patent. The written description can
only speak to the scope of protection through the terms provided in
the claims.' 21 Claim terms, however, will not be given their
ordinary meaning when the terms are used in the written
description of the patent in a manner that makes it manifestly clear
that the ordinary meaning of the claim's terms should be
restricted.122 Thus, the court in Teleflex provided a logical
standard that may be applied with certainty to achieve the goals of
the patent system. To apply a claim construction framework that
gives a patentee a scope of protection clearly broader than the "true
invention" she possessed at the time of patenting would lead to
further uncertainty and miss the aims of patent law. In summary,
because the Teleflex framework is the most logical claim
construction framework, lower courts will construe claims more
predictably; thus, patentees and practitioners will better understand
the scope of existing and future patents. These increases in
predictability and user comprehension will provide increased
certainty in claim construction.
1" Teleflex, 299 F.3d at 1327.
120 See id. at 1324 (asserting that "[t]he claims define the scope of the right to
exclude; the claim construction inquiry, therefore, begins and ends in all cases
with.., the claim") (quoting Renishaw P.L.C. v. Marposs Societa' Per Azioni,
158 F.3d 1243, 1248 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
121 Id.
122Id. at 1327.
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